model is tested with quarterly data on the stock of retail, office, and industrial real estate in the US. during the 1980:1-1990:11 period. Then, the results are compared and contrasted to adjustment speeds prevailing in Canadian and UK. real estate markets during approximately the same time period. Canadian and UK. commercial property markets provide an interesting juxtaposition to US. commercial property markets given their strikingly different institutional relationships. Barkham and GeItner [2] note that, owing to greater homogeneity in England, u.K. commercial real estate markets are far more informationally efficient than in the US. Byrne and Goldberg [8] argue that differences between US. and UK. commercial real estate cycles may arise as a result of dissimilarities in market size. We attribute the greater stability in Canadian and UK. commercial property markets to a variety of factors.
II. Market Adjustment Process for Commercial Real Estate
There is a tendency to regard commercial real estate prices and rents as being relatively slow to adjust, and to assume that the quantity of space will adjust to equilibrate the market. Rosen and Smith [24] , for example, have asserted that residential landlords react to fluctuations in demand primarily by building up or drawing down inventories of unlet space. Residential prices and rents are then affected but only after a lag.
A similar price-adjustment process for commercial real estate has been suggested by Shilling, Sirmans, and Corgel [27] , and Voith and Crone [29] . They find that price adjustments are the strongest when the gap between the normal, long-run vacancy rate is the largest, and weakest when vacancies exceed the normal rate.
Wheaton [30] , and Wheaton and Torto [32] have argued that commercial rents are determined by bargaining between landlords and tenants. Landlords set the minimum rent that they will accept based on an expected vacant time on the market. The expected vacant time decreases with the flow of prospective tenants and increases with the amount of competitive space available. Tenants set the maximum rent that they will pay based on the opportunities they have available to rent other space and on the competition they perceive from other prospective tenants. Actual rents are determined somewhere between the maximum that the tenant will pay and the minimum that the landlord will accept. Wheaton and Torto [32] further assume that, because landlords and tenants may be slow to perceive the flow of perspective tenants or the amount of competitive space on the market, the actual level of rents will adjust gradually to the desired rent level.
There is room for argument whether quantity adjustments clear the commercial property markets. Studies by Barth et al. [3] , and Kling and McCue [19] find that there is a considerable lag in the supply response of new US. office construction to changing demand conditions. There is also some evidence of a weighty lag in the supply response of both industrial and retail real estate to changes in demand [31; 20; 4] . This work, however, can be criticized for various reasons. Perhaps the most damning criticism has to do with the failure of these studies to correct for autocorrelation in estimating adjustment speeds. It has long been realized that slow adjustment speeds can result when stock-adjustment models are estimated without correcting for autocorrelation [31; 20; 4].
III. A Stock-Adjustment Model of Commercial Real Estate
To examine the speed of adjustment in commercial real estate markets, we adopt the following specification. We begin by writing the desired stock of retail, office, or industrial properties as or where K i ; = the desired stock of capital, Ei = employment in industry i, cP = average square feet per employee, and Cit = random error term.
The subscript i in this case refers to the retail, office, or industrial sector.! Next, we write a stock-adjustment model for retail, office, and industrial properties as where Kit = actual stock of capital, and 8i = the speed of adjustment parameter.
(1)
Equation ( 3) specifies that the change in Kit will respond only partially to the difference between the desired level of K i ; and the past value of Kit-I. The rate at which the market responds is the adjustment coefficient 8i . If 8i equals one, then K i ; equals Kit in each period and markets fully adjust each period (which would be indicative of a build-to-suit real estate market with no speculative construction). As 8i becomes closer to zero, however, the longer it takes for real estate markets to equilibrate. This framework is developed in Blinder [6] , and Maccini and Rossana [21] , and many other papers.
Substituting equation (2) for K i ; in (3) yields (4) or (5) where (3ji = 8i(3jiU = 0, 1), (32i = (1 -8i), and eit = 8iCit.
Finally, and most important, it might be thought that the error term Cit follows an AR(I) process. Hence, to estimate (5) we use the following two-step procedure. First, we estimate or
From the coefficients of Eit and Eit-I, we get an estimate of Pi, where Pi = -f-Li2/f-Lil. We use this estimate of Pi to construct Kit = Kit -PiKit-1 and Eit = Eit -PiEit-J. and then estimate (8) to get unique estimates of Oi, 13iO, and 13il'
Note that in the likely event that the error terms ~it in (5) are correlated across the different real estate markets (Le., adjustments made in one market, while moving it towards equilibrium, move the other markets away from equilibrium), we estimate (7) and (8) To account for the adjustment lags between K i ; and Eit , we adopted a sequential search process? This search process entailed estimating various versions of (5) with lagged values of Eit and choosing that lag structure for which the residual sum of squares was minimum. The reader is spared the laborious details of the many regressions that were run.
To control for the effect of climatic and institutional events that repeat more or less regularly each year, three seasonal 0-1 variables are added to (5): S2 which takes on the value of 1 for the summer quarter and zero otherwise, S3 which takes on the value of 1 for the fall quarter and zero otherwise, and S4 which takes on the value of 1 for the winter quarter and zero otherwise.
IV. The Data
Our measures of Kit and Eit are in dollar values, as opposed to physical units, and generally cover the period 1980:1-1990:2. Values of Kit are computed from the flow of funds accounts for the US., Canada, and the UK. (see appendix for a more complete discussion). The data we analyze for Eit are from the National Income and Product Accounts (or National Income and Expenditure data) for the US., Canada, and the UK. All flows are measured at quarterly rates. 
Construction Put in Place [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] (or a 41 percent increase). For Canada, total construction put in place increased in real terms from $6,981 million (Canadian dollars) in 1980 to $10,978 million (Canadian dollars) in 1990
(or a 57 percent increase). In comparison, total construction put in place in the u.K. increased in real terms from £5,318 million in 1980 to £6,220 million in 1990 (or a 17 percent increase).
Second, the rapid growth in office construction in the U.S. took place despite the fact that, as best as we can tell, investors were earning, on average, negative "excess returns" on office buildings. These quarterly returns are based on Frank Russell Company /National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (FRC/NCREIF) less the risk-free rate and represent the performance of real estate investments made by large institutional investors? In contrast, excess rates of return in the u.K. c '" Figure 2B ). Also notice that for Canada we restrict our attention to retail and office bUildings.
Note that for the United Kingdom we have had to modify our definitions of non-residential real estate somewhat. The UK. classifies non-residential real estate into two categories: commercial or industrial. Commercial real estate in this case includes income-producing property Figure 3B ).
V. Estimation Results
Results of estimating (5) for U.S. retail, office, and industrial markets are provided in Table II , with standard errors shown in parentheses. Column (1) is estimated using ordinary least squares. Columns (2) and (3) are estimated using our two-step estimation procedure to correct for serial correlation.
A few brief comments about Table II seem in order. First, the coefficient of Et -x , where x refers to a x-period lag, suggests that it takes between eight and twelve quarters for U.S. retail, office, and industrial markets to detect a change in the desired Kit and then to alter the actual Kit. This adjustment lag suggests that construction activity in the U.S. is relatively slow to react to economic shocks.
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80. Second, the estimated short-run income elasticities for U.S. retail, office, and industrial properties are 0.07, 0.08, and 0.10, respectively. And the estimated long-run income elasticities are 1.68, 0.31, and 0.19, respectively. These elasticities are measured in the usual way. 5 Third, as might be expected, the estimated speeds of adjustment are much slower for U.S. retail properties than for U.S. office and industrial buildings. This contention arises because most retail properties possess spatial monopolies to some degree either in fact or in the mind of the consumer. And so retail properties, in general, tend to be much more insulated from increased competition than office and industries properties. Adjustment speeds for U.S. retail, office, and industrial properties also depend on the rate of economic growth within each sector. Faster economic growth generally implies a more rapid adjustment whenever new capital stock is more efficient than old.
Our estimate of the speed of adjustment of Kit to K i ; for U.S. retail properties is 0.0392 (that is, 3.92 percent per quarter). In contrast, the 8i point estimate for the U.S. office market is 26.94 percent per quarter (see column (2)). And for U.S. industrial properties, the 8i point estimate 5 . We calculate the short-run and long-run elasticities as where a bar indicates the mean value. is 54.96 percent per quarter (see column (3)); more than fourteen times that of the speed of adjustment for US. retail properties. 6 Our results for Canadian real estate markets are shown in Table III . Both equations in Table III are based on Zellner's Seemingly Unrelated Regression technique adjusted for serial correlation. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Overall, the findings suggest that Canadian real estate markets adjust much quicker to shocks in K i ; than US. real estate markets.
The estimates of f371 in Table III ties and 4.01 percent for UK. industrial properties. The estimated short-run income elasticities for UK. commercial and industrial properties are 0.01 and 0.008, respectively. And the estimated long-run income elasticities are 0.24 and 0.20, respectively. The estimate of (3it also suggests that it takes, on average, eight quarters for UK. commercial and industrial markets to detect a change in the desired Kit and then to alter the actual Kit. In general, the points to note about these results are (1) most commercial property markets suffer from a relatively long adjustment lag, and (2) contrary to the more recent theory on price-adjustment and market dynamics, quantity adjustments in commercial real estate markets are fairly sluggish.
VI. Simulated Real Estate Cycles
We now wish to illustrate the implications of the models estimated in section V. To do so, we simulate the impact of a 10 percent reduction in income on Kit under the following assumptions. First, we assume that once Kit adjusts to the new K i ; it will stay there indefinitely, under the assumption of constant demand and supply. We also assume that oscillations about the equilibrium value of Kit occur as the lagged-supply response works through the models. The cycle attenuates given sufficient time and, as eventual equilibrium is reached, the cycle ceases to exist. Figure 4 presents the results of our simulations for U.S. real estate markets. The percent deviations from the steady-state Kit that are shown in Figure 4 depend significantly on the estimated income elasticities and the observed adjustment speeds. Relatively slow adjustment speeds, for example, will tend to cause moderately flat real estate cycles. Relatively fast adjustment speeds, on the other hand, will tend to cause rather abrupt cycles and large social costs. For the US. office market, our simulations suggest that, after the adjustment lag, it takes about two years for the adjustment of the actual stock to be 90 percent complete. The corre· sponding adjustment period for the US. industrial real estate market is less than one year. For retail properties, the adjustment period is in excess of ten years. 7 An interesting contrast to these adjustment speeds is provided by Muth [22] . Muth finds that the adjustment period in the US. housing market is roughly six years. Rydell [25] , on the other hand, finds that there is a 90 percent adjustment in the stock of housing within three years. Rydell also finds that the extent of the adjustment period depends upon the vacancy rates in the markets. At higher vacancy rates, the short·run effect of price is smaller and the long·run effect on quantity of housing services consumed is much higher.
Along these same lines, anecdotal evidence suggests that the adjustment speed for US. office buildings increased from six years of extra supply in 1988 to twelve years in 1991 [26] . Adjustment speeds for US. industrial and retail properties are much harder to document. Kling and McCue [20] , using a vector autoregression model, document that macroeconomic variables affect industrial construction with a lag and that this lag is generally shorter than those reported for office properties. 7 . Note that these findings have nothing to say about the variation in the speed of adjustment among U. S. retail, office, and industrial real estate markets. To do so, it would be desirable to estimate equation (5) with data from the particular local real estate market to obtain the speed of adjustment for that market. For Canadian real estate markets, our simulations suggest that the real estate cycles are much less sensational than US. real estate cycles -meaning the percent deviations from steady-state are much lower (see Figure 5) . Also of central interest is the fact that approximately 90 percent of the excess supply in both Canadian retail and office markets is worked off in less than one year.
We further notice that UK. real estate cycles are, by far, the most sedate (see Figure 6 ). The percent deviations from steady-state for UK. commercial or industrial real estate never exceed 1/2 of one percent. Our simulations also suggest that with UK. investors seeking to add about one-sixth of the difference between desired and actual stock during a year, for the adjustment of the actual stock of UK. commercial and industrial real estate to be 90 percent complete, roughly fourteen years are required.
VII. Explanations for the Abrupt Real Estate Cycles in the U.S. during the 1980s
The most likely explanation of the abrupt real estate cycles in the US. during the 1980s is that they were caused by a variety of factors. Hendershott and Kane [16] argue that the decade-long crisis in the S&L industry and US. federal government's handling of that crisis created a lending frenzy in the US. during the 1980s, and that this lending frenzy led to vast amounts of overbuilding in US. real estate markets as many developers lost sight of demand and supply factors.
A second seemingly possible explanation for the abrupt real estate cycles in the US. during the 1980s is Keynes's [18] bounded rationality argument. For a recent discussion of this literature applied to real estate, see De Bondt [12] .
A third explanation of the abrupt real estate cycles in the US. during the 1980s asserts that Figure 6 . Overbuilding Caused by a 10% Reduction in Y: U.K. Real Estate pro-development attitudes like those in many metropolitan areas in the US. tend to encourage overbuilding, whereas controlled growth environments like those in Canada and the UK. tend to foster a positive investment climate in the long-run. As another possibility, US. real estate markets during the 1980s may have responded rationally to large negative demand shocks. Cauley [10] notes that, after a negative demand shocklike a change in tax laws as a restructuring and downsizing of the consumer, office, and defense sectors of the economy, all of which occurred in the US. during the 1980s -investors will typically wait until the price uncertainty is resolved to transact. This decline in asset liquidity, if substantial enough, can easily account for an abrupt real estate cycle.
Many of the international differences in real estate cycles may also arise as a result of dissimilarities in market size. For a more complete discussion of the relationship between real estate cycles and market size, see Bryne and Goldberg [8] .
VIII. Events Since 1990
Events since 1990 suggest that there have been marked changes in Canadian and UK. commercial real estate markets. Canadian commercial real estate markets, for example, appear at the moment to be vastly overbuilt. Greater metropolitan Toronto's year-end 1992 vacancy rate of 18.2 percent represents a high watermark in the market's vacancy problem. Montreal's overall office vacancy rate increased from 12.8 percent in 1990 to 17.9 percent in 1992. Ottawa's 1992 office vacancy rate is 12.1 percent, while office vacancies in Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver are currently in the 13 to 20 percent range.
UK. commercial real estate markets also appear at the moment to be vastly overbuilt. Office vacancy rates in London's City and West End, for example, now exceed 15 percent. As a consequence of the excess supply and slow absorption of commercial space, property values have fallen and building yields (rents divided by capital values) have increased significantly. Currently, building yields are over 9 percent -a historical high. These events predict a marked reduction in adjustment speeds for Canadian and UK. real estate markets.
In the US., it is really much too early to tell whether or not returns from commercial real estate investments have bottomed out. During the past few years, new construction in the US. has slowed dramatically as lenders, wary of the excesses of the 1980s, have been very reluctant to finance real estate developments. 8 There are also signs that real estate markets have matured from one where developers-investors typically built for their own portfolios into one where institutional investors -like in the UK. -are the driving force behind the merchant builder. Still, vacancy rates for office space hover in the 15-20 percent range, with some cities above 25 percent. Demand in the retail, office, and industrial areas remains weak in most markets and real returns on commercial real estate are at all-time lows.
IX. Concluding Comments
In the literature, it is frequently asserted that commercial real estate prices and rents move sluggishly toward equilibrium, leaving the quantity of space to act as a market clearer. Our results cast some serious doubts on this proposition. First, we find that quantity adjustments in US. commercial property markets respond with a relatively long lag before changes in the desired new capital stock are taken into account. We also find that, once the desired new capital stock is phased-in, the adjustment period is far from instantaneous. For US. office and industrial real estate markets, for example, the adjustment period ranges from one to two years. For US. retail property markets, the adjustment period is significantly longer. It should also be emphasized that, taken together, these results suggest that commercial property markets in the US. are susceptible to pronounced boom-and-bust cycles.
Somewhat faster adjustment speeds with relatively shorter adjustment lags are found for Canadian commercial property markets. In UK. real estate markets, we find noticeably slower adjustment speeds. Most conspicuous in both Canadian and UK. commercial property markets is the responsiveness of commercial real estate to changes in income. Rather than observing periods of substantial overbuilding followed by periods of little, or no, growth, we find much greater stability in both Canadian and UK. commercial property markets (at least through the end of 1990).
Appendix. Variables and Data Sources
The following variables appear in the text.
United States:
Kit = outstanding stock of commercial real estate (in $ millions), constructed using a perpetual inven- 8 . The passage of the Financial Institutions Regulatory Reform and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 and comparable tightening of capital requirements on commercial banks has also played a major role in the continued decline of commercial construction put in place during the last few years.
